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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the jurisprudential concepts that effect the conduct and
sanctity of the legal profession, none is more revered than the attor-
ney-client privilege.1 While the privilege is given a pre-eminent place
in the pantheon of principles that protect and foster the vitality of the
adversary system, the work product doctrine2 often has a more perva-
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
1. UpJohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
2. Work product consists of the tangible and intangible material that reflects an
attorney's efforts at investigating and preparing a case, including one's pattern of
investigation, assembling of information, determination of the relevant facts,
preparation of legal theories, planning of strategy, and recording of mental im-
pressions. The privilege creates a zone of privacy in which an attorney can inves-
tigate, prepare, and analyze a case. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8,
1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980).
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sive impact on the manner in which a client's case proceeds through
the litigation process. While the attorney-client privilege protects
only confidential communications between client and attorney, the
work product doctrine protects a wide variety of information and
materials that have been gathered or prepared by an attorney on a
client's behalf for or in anticipation of litigation.3
Stemming as it does from a concern for the privacy in which an
attorney can best explore and prepare a client's case,4 the protections
accorded work product spread a broad protective shield around the
efforts and activities of counsel.S When an attorney is free to pursue a
client's interests without substantial intrusion from the opposing
party, both the client and the legal system benefit from the thorough-
ness with which the attorney prepares the client's case.6 The more an
attorney restricts his or her efforts, for fear that the opposing party
will be entitled to the fruits of those efforts through the discovery pro-
cess, 7 the more the client's case and the adversary system are denied
the factual and legal information necessary for a fair and thorough
determination of the issues on their merits.8
Since it is the attorney's efforts which are, first and foremost, the
subject of the protections accorded work product,9 it should come as
no surprise that the legal profession both vigorously asserts and jeal-
ously guards this important adversarial concept. It should also come
as no surprise that the use and misuse of the work product doctrine
has bred confusion and misconceptions as to its scope and function in
the contex of day-to-day litigation.O
3. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
4. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980).
5. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981).
6. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
7. As Justice Jackson observed in his concurring opinion in Hickman: "Discovery
was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its function either
without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary." AL at 516 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
8. Id. at 510-11.
9. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981).
10. More often than not, the work product doctrine is discussed in language that re-
sults in imbuing it with the type of olympian stature that misleads rather than
instructs those who seek to apply it in the context of day-to-day litigation:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for
the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful inter-
ests of his client. In performing his various duties, however, it is essen-
tial that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
However, absent the protections of the work product doctrine: "[Ilnefficiency,
unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal
advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice
would be poorly served." Id. at 511.
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From its inception, the work product doctrine has been viewed as
applying, somewhat differently, to two distinct categories of informa-
tion.31 The first, usually referred to as "ordinary" or "fact" work
product, encompasses materials of a purely factual nature prepared by
or for an attorney in anticipation of litigation or trial.12 These materi-
als have always been subject to discovery upon a showing of substan-
tial need and unavailability from other sources.1 3 The second category
of information is usually referred to as "opinion" work product and
encompasses materials containing the impressions, opinions, conclu-
sions, and theories of counsel.14 The discoverability of this category of
work product has been and continues to be an area of controversy,
confusion, and sharply divided opinion. Some courts have held that
opinion work product is never discoverable.15 Other courts have held
that it is discoverable, but disagree on the showing necessary to obtain
disclosure.' 6 It is the opinion work product category and the issue of
its discoverability that form the primary focus of this Article.
After a brief examination of the fundamental concepts and consid-
erations that underlie the work product doctrine, the Article will as-
sess the discoverability of opinion work product as it exists today in
the federal courts. Then, a single discovery standard and analytical
framework for applying that standard will be proposed in an effort to
bring unity to an area of disparate viewpoints and results. Since the
discovery standard and analytical framework proposed herein attempt
to unify and accommodate the various polices and concerns expressed
by the courts that have examined the discoverability issue, it repre-
sents a careful balancing of the competing interests that lie at the very
heart of the adversary system, i.e. the zone of privacy accorded an at-
torney in the preparation of a client's case (work product) versus the
11. Id at 511-13.
12. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F.
Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Minn. 1979).
13. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
14. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F.
Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Minn. 1979).
15. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d
840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973).
16. "In our view, opinion work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be
discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances." In re Murphy,
560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977).
It is therefore apparent that the basic thrust of Hickman and its prog-
eny is that documents containing the work product of attorneys which
contain the attorneys' thoughts, impressions, views, strategy, conclu-
sions, and other similar information produced by the attorney in antici-
pation of litigation are to be protected when feasible, but not at the
expense of hiding the non-privileged facts from adversaries or the court.
Xerox Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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full disclosure of issues and facts before trial as promoted by the depo-
sition-discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17 It is
only through the furtherance of both interests, which at times though
may be contradictory, that the vitality and fairness of the adversary
system can be maintained.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The discoverability of an attorney's work product was first ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.1 8 In Hickman,
the Court was faced with a clash of competing interests when a party
sought to employ the liberalized discovery procedures contained in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to compel disclosure of information
personally compiled by the opposing party's counsel in preparation for
possible litigation.19
The Court began its analysis by declaring that "the pre-trial deposi-
tion-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the
most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure"2 0 and that these rules were to be accorded broad and liberal
treatment.2 ' Since mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by
both parties was essential to the proper conduct of litigation,22 the dis-
covery mechanisms contained in the Federal Rules assured that civil
trials in the federal courts no longer needed to be carried out in the
dark.23 As the Court noted: "The way is now clear, consistent with
recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."24
Turning to the issue of the discovery of materials personally pre-
pared by counsel, the Court acknowledged that an attorney, engaged
in the representation of a client, in order to discharge his or her duties
to the client in a responsible and effective manner, must be allowed a
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing
parties and their counsel.25 Proper preparation of a client's case de-
17. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-0i, 510-11 .(1947).
18. 1& at 495. (a suit under the Jones Act for the death of a crew member who
drowned when the tugboat upo, which he was' employed sank in the Delaware
River).
19. Plaintiff sought discovery of information personally obtained by defendant's
counsel when he interviewed various witnesses, including the surviving crew
members of the tug, soon after the accident. The plaintiff not only sought any
statements, notes or memoranda concerning counsel's interviews with the wit-
nesses, but also counsel's recollections of the interviews where no statements,
notes, or memoranda existed. Id-
20. Id. at 500.
21. Id. at 507.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 501.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 510-11.
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manded that an attorney investigate and compile factual information,
sift what he or she considered to be relevant from that which appeared
to be irrelevant, prepare his or her legal theories, and plan strategy
without undue and needless interference from the opposing party.2 6
Were unfettered scrutiny of an attorney's files to be allowed, counsel
would be reluctant to fully inquire into the merits of their case and
thereafter reduce to writing both the information obtained and coun-
sel's own opinions and conclusions regarding the facts and the law.
The obvious fear was that such materials and information would be
available to opposing counsel simply for the asking.27 The Hickman
court believed that such a discovery practice would ill-serve the inter-
ests of clients and the cause of justice.28
Balancing the liberalized discovery of the Federal Rules with the
need for according attorneys a certain degree of privacy in the prepa-
ration of their cases, the Court imposed certain restrictions on the dis-
coverability of all tangible and intangible material prepared by an
attorney for or in anticipation of litigation that reflected the attorney's
investigative efforts, case preparation, planning, strategies, and legal
theories.29 These materials have come to be known as attorney work
product, and it is the restrictions on the discoverability of these mater-
ials that have come to be known as the work product doctrine. 30
The Hickman court recognized two distinct catergories of work
product and imposed upon each a different degree of discovery protec-
tion. To the extent that work product contained relevant nonprivi-
leged factual material, the Court merely shifted the standard
presumption in favor of discovery and required the requesting party to
show "adequate reasons" or some "necessity or justification" for dis-
closure of the work product at issue.3 ' Such factual work product,
often taking the form of witness statements, photographs, or data
compilations, has come to be known as "ordinary" work product.32 To
the extent that work product reveals the opinions, judgments, and
thought processes of an attorney, the Hickman court accorded it a sub-
26. Id. at 511.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 511-13.
30. While some courts and practitioners prefer the term work product privilege, (see,
e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 331-35 (8th Cir. 1977)), others prefer to draw a
clear distinction between work product and the privilege accorded attorney-client
communications: "[W]hile the attorney-client privilege has previously been dis-
cussed as being relatively absolute, the so-called 'work product' privilege is not a
privilege, but is a qualified immunity from discovery." International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla. 1973). To avoid any
confusion, the term work product doctrine will be used throughout this Article.
31. Hickman v Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 334
(8th Cir. 1977).
32. United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Minn. 1979).
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stantially higher degree of protection from disclosure by requiring a
party seeking discovery of such materials to show "extraordinary jus-
tification."33 This second category of work product, often taking the
form of an attorney's notes, memoranda, personal data summaries,
and planning documents, has come to be known as "opinion" work
product.34
The work product doctrine is in some measure related to the attor-
ney-client privilege because work product represents efforts expended
by an attorney during the course of the attorney-client relationship.
However, the two concepts are separate and distinct from each other
and reflect very different policy considerations.3 5 The purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to encourange the complete disclosure of
information by a client to his or her attorney.36 The privilege belongs
to the client, and is intended to impose a cloak of privacy around confi-
dential communications made in the course of the attorney-client rela-
tionship.3 7 The work product doctrine, on the other hand, is aimed at
protecting the effectiveness of an attorney's case preparation by insu-
lating from discovery those materials prepared or obtained by an at-
torney for or in anticipation of litigation. The doctrine assures an
attorney that, in the absence of special circumstances, his or her files
shall remain free from the intrusions of opposing counsel.38 Further-
more, the protections of the work product doctrine belong to both the
client and the attorney and can be asserted by either independently.39
Finally, the work product doctrine is a substantially broader con-
cept than that of the attorney-client privilege. Although only confi-
dential communications between the attorney and client are protected
by the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine encom-
33. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-14 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336
(8th Cir. 1977).
34. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F.
Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Minn. 1979).
35. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
36. Id. at 929-30. See also cases cited supra note 1.
37. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
38. I& See also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
39. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury,
640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980).
One court has stated:
A lawyer may assert the work product privilege, indeed, it has been said
that he alone may invoke it. We are not inclined to accept quite that
narrow an application, however. It is not realistic to hold that it is only
the attorney who has an interest in his work product or that the princi-
pal purpose of the privilege-to foster and protect proper preparation of
a case-is not also of deep concern to the client, the person paying for
that work. To the extent a client's interest may be affected, he, too, may
assert the work product privilege.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings,'604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979) (citations and foot-
note omitted).
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passes any objects, materials, or information obtained for or prepared
in anticipation of litigation or trial.40 Thus, the quantity and type of
information potentially protected by the work product doctrine far ex-
ceeds that of the attorney-client privilege.
Although the fundamental concept of work product was initially
recognized and applied in the context of civil litigation, the principles
underlying the doctrine-promoting thorough and complete prepara-
tion and presentation of each side of a dispute-are clearly applicable
in a wide variety of legal contexts. It is not surprising, therefore, that
in the decades since Hickman was decided, the work product doctrine
has been found applicable to criminal prosecutions,41 grand jury pro-
ceedings, 42 and the enforcement of administrative subpoenas.43
Until 1970, the work product doctrine remained a creature of case
law, depending on Hickman and its progeny for guidance. In 1970,
however, the doctrine received its first federal codification when Rule
26(b)(3) was added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.44
Initially, it should be noted that Rule 26(b)(3) establishes a reason-
ably clear standard for the discoverability of ordinary or factual work
product; that is, work product that does not contain the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, or opinions of counsel. Improving on the some-
what murky language of the Court in Hickman, the drafters of the
Rule made ordinary work product discoverable only upon a showing
of substantial need and the inability to secure, without undue hard-
ship, the substantial equivalent of the sought-after information by al-
ternate means. This test for discoverability45 has provided the courts
with an easily applicable standard by which to assess the burden that
must be met by a party seeking discovery of ordinary work product.
In this respect, the Rule clearly aided both the courts and counsel in
40. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
41. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
42. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973).
43. UpJohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) reads in pertinent part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things ...
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in
the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In
ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
45. The test for discoverability, in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), involves two distinct ele-
ments: substantial need, and inability to secure the substantial equivalent of the
information through alternate means without undue hardship.
[Vol. 64:248
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clarifying the circumstances under which ordinary work product must
be disclosed in response to a valid request for discovery.
The Rule also resolved the nagging question of whether work prod-
uct protection attached only to materials prepared by an attorney or
whether it also protected materials prepared by others. Rule 26(b)(3)
now clearly extends work product protection to materials prepared in
anticipation of litigation or trial by not only an attorney, but also by
others functioning for or on behalf of a party, such as a consultant,
insurer, agent, surety, and/or indemnitor.46
As much as Rule 26(b)(3) attempts to solve problems, it also is sus-
piciously vague in areas of considerable significance. For example,
when we turn to the issue of the discoverability of opinion work prod-
uct, the Rule is of little help. Besides indicating that in ordering dis-
closure of ordinary work product a court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party, the drafters
of the Rule failed to address, in any meaningful way, the specific issue
of the direct discoverability of opinion work product.47 Furthermore,
the Rule, on its face, applies only to "documents and tangible things."
Information obtained in anticipation of litigation or trial that does not
exist in tangible form at the time discovery is sought simply does not
come within the ambit of the Rule.48 Therefore, when conversations,
interviews, observations, and/or tests are not reduced to writing or
other means of recordation, Rule 26(b)(3) is simply not applicable.
When an item of work product does not come within Rule 26(b)(3)
or for which the Rule offers little useful guidance, counsel and the
courts must revert to a consideration of the principles enunciated in
Hickman and the cases thereafter that have applied and expanded the
work product doctrine.49 In dealing with opinion work product in par-
ticular, the issue of its discoverability is one in which the caselaw, in
attempting to grapple with the issue of disclosure, is only moderately
more enlightening that the language contained in Rule 26(b)(3).
III. OPINION WORK PRODUCT
Any examination of that part of the work product doctrine that
involves an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal
theories, must keep clearly in mind the fundamental reasons for the
existence of the doctrine in the first place:
The primary purpose of the work product privilege is to assure that an attor-
46. See the express language of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), supra note 44.
47. Compare the language of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) with the advisory committee
notes on this same subsection of the Rule, 48 F.R.D. at 487, 502 (1970).
48. 4 J. MooRE, J. LucAs & G. GROTHER JR., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.64[i],
at 26-348 (2d ed. 1984).
49. Id.
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ney is not inhibited in his representation of his client by the fear that his files
will be open to scrutiny upon demand of an opposing party. Counsel should be
allowed to amass data and commit his opinions and thought processes to writ-
ing free of the concern that, at some later date, an opposing party may be
entitled to secure any relevant work product documents merely on request
and use them against the client.5 0
When courts have sought to resolve the issue of the potential discover-
ability of opinion work product, they have interpreted the work prod-
uct doctrine's "primary purpose" in very different ways. This has
given rise to a variety of approaches to the discoverability issue. How-
ever, before we examine this range of approaches, two preliminary is-
sues must first be addressed.
A. Discovering Factual Information
The first issue, which seems to bother lawyers more than it should,
relates to whether or not the work product doctrine precludes the dis-
covery of relevant facts gathered by the lawyer during his or her ef-
forts on the client's behalf. For example, during the interview of
witness A, the lawyer learns of the existence of witness B. Can the
lawyer then, in response to an interrogatory requesting the names and
addresses of all known witnesses, decline to reveal the existence of
witness B based upon the protections of the work product doctrine?
The answer to this question was clearly provided by the Supreme
Court in Hickman. The Court pointed out that where relevant and
non-privileged facts were contained in an attorney's file, and where
discovery was essential to preparation of the opposing party's case,
such facts were clearly discoverable or the "liberal ideals of the depo-
sition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would be stripped of much of their meaning."5 1
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed this same problem in
the context of the attorney-client privilege. The Court noted that the
privilege protected against disclosure of communications between a
client and his attorney, but did not protect against disclosure of the
underlying facts known by those who communicate with an attor-
ney.5 2 Similarly, while witness A's written statement may be pro-
tected from discovery as ordinary work product and an interview
50. In re Murphy 560 F.2d, 326, 334 (8th Cir. 1977).
51. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
52. '[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and
not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that
fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to an-
swer the question "What did you say or write to the attorney?" but may
not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely be-
cause he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to
his attorney.'
UpJohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (quoting Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
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summary prepared by the lawyer protected from discovery as opinion
work product, the basic facts provided by witness A, as long as they
are relevant and not protected from disclosure by another evidentiary
privilege, are discoverable by the opposing party. Where a document
may be insulated from a Request for Production, the facts contained
therein must be disclosed in response to a properly worded interro-
gatory or deposition question.53
Attorneys often refuse to disclose during discovery those facts that
they have acquired through their investigative efforts and assert, as
the basis for their refusal, the protections of the work product doc-
trine.54 Where such facts are concerned, as opposed to the documents
containing them or the impressions and conclusions drawn from them,
they must be disclosed to the opposing party in response to a proper
request for discovery.55 Otherwise, discovery would be a meaningless
tool and we would be back to the era before the advent of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when "mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties"56 was far from the guiding principle of
the federal litigation process.
B. What Types of Information Constitute Opinion Work Product?
The second preliminary issue that must be addressed before we can
move on to an examination of the problem of the discoverability of
opinion work product is the question of what types of information and
materials have been found to constitute opinion work product. It is
one thing to say that opinion work product is the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of counsel.57 It is quite an-
other to say whether a particular memorandum, report, letter or piece
of information is or contains opinion work product. To understand the
53. The courts have consistently held that the work product concept fur-
nishes no shield against discovery, by interrogatories or by deposition, of
the facts that the adverse party's lawyer has learned, or the persons from
whom he has learned such facts, or the existence or nonexistence of doc-
uments, even though the documents themselves may not be subject to
discovery.
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2023, at 194
(1970).
54. The court in Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 624 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976), observed that while data summaries were protected from disclo-
sure by the work product doctrine, a verbatim witness statement, or other objec-
tive data contained in a memorandum prepared for litigation, was not protected
from disclosure.
55. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)
advisory committee notes, 48 F.R.D. 485, 502 (1970) (commenting on the relation-
ship between Rule 26(b)(3) and the amended rules on interrogatories and re-
quests for admission).
56. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
57. This language is the terminology used in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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wide range of information and materials that the courts have catego-
rized as opinion work product, one needs to briefly review a sampling
of cases in which potential opinion work product was at issue.
There can be no question that an opinion letter to a client,58 a
memorandum outlining an attorney's evaluation of and strategies for a
particular case,59 and instructions to subordinates regarding investiga-
tive approaches60 all constitute opinion work product. Such informa-
tion and materials have as their primary function the recording and
communication of the attorney's impressions, opinions, conclusions,
and theories regarding the legal and factual aspects of the case. But
once we move away from such relatively clear examples of opinion
work product, we discover that almost anything can be placed in the
opinion work product category.
How, we might ask, can a purely factual memorandum prepared by
an attorney, summarizing an interview with a witness, be classified as
opinion work product? All the memorandum contains is the attor-
ney's recollection of what the witness told him. If it contains any im-
pressions, opinions or conclusions, they surely are those of the witness
and not the attorney. Therefore, at most, such a memorandum should
be classified as ordinary work product, not opinion work product. But
such a memorandum has long been held to be opinion work product
on the theory that even though it is a factual summary, it indirectly
reflects the attorney's mental impressions and analytical approach to
the factual and legal issues involved in the case. 61 What the attorney
choses to record, the manner and order of that recordation, and the
emphasis placed on one set of facts over another reveals something of
the attorney's mental processes and his or her consideration and
weighing of the facts. Such information clearly constitutes potential
opinion work product and the courts have so held.62
Once we recognize that even purely factual materials can indi-
rectly reveal an attorney's opinions and conclusions regarding a partic-
ular case, it is entirely logical to find that a wide range of attorney
generated information can be classified as opinion work product. In
Besly-Welles Corp. v. Balax, Inc.,63 the defendants asked the plaintiffs,
by way of several interrogatories, to disclose what efforts had been
undertaken to locate witnesses having information regarding a partic-
ular aspect of the case. The interrogatories, however, did not request
the names and addresses of witnesses having knowledge of the rele-
58. Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 456 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
59. In re Natta, 410 F.2d 187 (3d. Cir. 1969).
60. Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., 476 F. Supp. 713, 718 (D.D.C. 1979); Besly-Welles Corp. v.
Balax, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
61. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979).
62. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973).
63. 43 F.R.D. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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vant facts, but rather asked for information regarding the broader sub-
ject of investigative efforts. The court held that the interrogatories in
question asked for information that clearly constituted opinion work
product since an attorney's pattern of investigation and exploration of
his or her case can indirectly reveal the attorney's thought processes,
analysis, and developing impressions of both the legal and factual is-
sues involved. The court noted that "[i]n attempting to locate wit-
nesses on a certain topic an attorney will often talk to numerous
prospects; the work product rule was designed to prevent unlimited
interference with such preparations."6 4
It has long been an accepted practice during the taking of a deposi-
tion for a witness to be asked what information he or she reviewed and
what persons were spoken with in preparation for their deposition ap-
pearance. Without such information, meaningful and probing exami-
nation of the witness's testimony and credibility cannot be effectively
carried out. In Ford v. Philips Electronics Instruments Co.,65 defend-
ant's counsel subpoened an independent witness for oral deposition.
During the deposition, defendant's counsel asked the witness about a
conversation the witness had with the plaintiff's counsel on the morn-
ing of the deposition. Plaintiff's counsel objected to this line of inquiry
as an attempt to probe his mental impressions and legal theories con-
cerning the case. The court agreed that such a line of questioning gen-
erally intruded on the attorney's opinion work product:
Insofar as defendant's question attempted to elicit from the witness the spe-
cific questions that plaintiff's counsel posed to him, or even the area of the
case to which he directed the majority of his questions, it exceeds the permis-
sible bounds of discovery and begins to infringe on plaintiff's counsel's evalua-
tion of the case.66
The court then went on to hold that while the defendant's counsel
could inquire liberally into the substance of the witness's knowledge
concerning matters relevant to the subject matter of the action, such
an inquiry could not "include questions that tend to elicit the specific
questions posed to the witness by plaintiff's counsel, the general line
of inquiry pursued by plaintiff's counsel, the facts to which plaintiff's
counsel appeared to attach significance, or any other matter that
reveals plaintiff's counsel's mental impressions concerning the case."67
The view held by the court in Ford is widely held by a substantial
number of courts and commentators. 68 Any documents, materials or
information that could conceivably reveal the impressions, conclu-
64. Id. at 371.
65. 82 F.R.D. 359 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
66. Id. at 360.
67. Id. at 361.
68. See, e.g., Ceco Steel Prod. Corp. v. H.K. Porter Co., 31 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ill. 1962);
Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 755, 817-20 (1983). See
also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 502 (1970)
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sions, or evaluations of counsel are to be regarded as opinion work
product and protected in accordance with the fundamental principles
announced by the Supreme Court in Hickman.69 Once we recognize
that a wide variety of information, including purely factual materials
that appear on their face to be devoid of the impressions, opinions, and
conclusions of counsel, are still classifiable as opinion work product,
we can begin to see how substantial the conflict is between the work
product doctrine and the liberal pretrial discovery principles of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A perfect example of that conflict
and the lengths to which the opinion work product concept has com-
plicated, confused, and strained the judicial process can be found in
Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp. v. Underwriter Laboratories, Inc.7 0
In Wheeling-Pittsburg, the plaintiff served interrogatories that
sought detailed information regarding the nature of the damages al-
leged by one of the defendants in a counterclaim. The defendant un-
dertook the task of calculating the damages based on documents that
had been or were later produced to the plaintiff. Based on these calcu-
lations, the defendant answered plaintiff's interrrogatories in detail.
Subsequently, an employee of the defendant was deposed by the plain-
tiff and was questioned on the methodology and rationale employed in
determining the damages sought in the counterclaim. Defendant's
counsel objected to this line of inquiry on the basis that the answers
would reveal the thought processes, opinions, and theories of defend-
ant's counsel regarding the claim for damages. In other words, it
would violate the protections accorded the attorney's opinion work
product.
If we were to examine the controversy in Wheeling-Pittsburg in
light of our earlier discussion of Besley-Welles and Ford, we might
agree that the defendant's assertion of the protection accorded opinion
work product had some merit. But the court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh
did not think so. It first observed that the information sought did not
appear to even constitute work product, based on the definition of
work product in Hickman.71 Then, in the alternative, it held that
even if the information was work product, the plaintiff had estab-
lished good cause to justify its disclosure.72 The court observed that
without knowledge of the rationale employed at arriving at the dam-
age figures, the plaintiff could not properly analyze and evaluate the
("The courts have steadfastly safeguarded against disclosure of lawyers' mental
impressions and legal theories .... .
69. 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
70. 81 F.R.D. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
71. The Court defined work product as "written statements, private memoranda and
personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the
course of his legal duties." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
72. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriter Laboratories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8,
12 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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various documents produced by the defendant and the answers given
by the defendant to the plaintiff's interrogatories. Without the infor-
mation sought in the deposition, the court felt that all previously pro-
duced materials concerning the counterclaim for damages would be
meaningless.73 And then, essentially following express language
found in Hickman,74 the court held that the information being sought
by the plaintiff would eventually have to be revealed at trial in order
for the defendant to prove its damages and, therefore, there was sim-
ply no reason for delaying its disclosure. In other words, whether it
constituted opinion work product or not, there was something inher-
ently wrong with precluding or delaying disclosure of information that
formed the very foundation of the damages sought by defendant in its
counterclaim.
The court's cumbersome analysis reflects the discomfort that asser-
tion of opinion work product protection can often create. But in
Wheeling-Pittsburgh the court could simply have based its decision on
the absence of opinion work product, since what was being sought was
the substance of the witness's knowledge concerning the calculations
he made for and on behalf of the defendant. The witness was not
asked what he had been told by the attorney, but was asked instead
what methods and rationale he himself had used in arriving at the
figures that constituted defendant's alleged damages. This clearly
constitutes the substantive knowledge of a percepient witness and
could reasonably sustain a holding that opinion work product was sim-
ply not involved.7 5
In comparing the approaches employed by the courts in Besley-
Welles, Ford, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh, one confronts the clear con-
flict between protecting the privacy of an attorney's preparatory ef-
forts and the fundamental principle that a party should have access to
all relevant information concerning the case in which it is engaged.
The balance that must be struck between these two competing inter-
ests is a delicate one, since each concept plays an important role in
promoting the efficiency, credibility, and truth-seeking functions of
the litigation process.76 Yet the zone of privacy that has been erected
to promote and protect the private thoughts, opinions, and/or conclu-
sions of counsel would seem, even in such a balancing process, to be a
sanctuary within which discovery must not penetrate. For to permit
compelled disclosure would destroy an attorney's zone of privacy and
irrevocably affect the thoroughness with which a client's case was pre-
73. Id.
74. "The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the dis-
closure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding, it, thus
reducing the possibility of surprise." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
75. Ford v. Philips Elecs. Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
76. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 510-12 (1947).
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pared for eventual resolution. If the goals envisioned by the Supreme
Court in Hickman, when it created the work product doctrine, are to
be achieved, opinion work product would not seem to be subject to
compelled disclosure.
C. Is Opinion Work Product Discoverable?
In United States v. Nobles,77 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vi-
tality and importance of the work product doctrine as reflecting the
strong public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of
legal claims.7 8 The Court then went on to observe that "[a]t its core,
the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attor-
ney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and pre-
pare his client's case." 79 In the face of the Court's clear declaration
that the protection of an attorney's mental processes lies at the very
heart of the work product doctrine, how then can opinion work prod-
uct be discoverable? To require disclosure in response to a request for
discovery would undermine the zone of privacy that is accorded an
attorney's mental processes by the work product doctrine.
The court in Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chava-
noz ,80 was faced with this very issue and held that "[i]n our view, no
showing of relevance, substantial need or undue hardship should jus-
tify compelled disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions or legal theories."8 1 The court reasoned that the
protection of an attorney's mental processes was essential to the func-
tioning of the adversary system. In its veiw, even the remote possibil-
ity that opinion work product materials or information might come to
light in exceptional circumstances would deter attorneys from freely
recording their mental impressions and conclusions in a candid and
dispassionate manner. Without absolute protection for opinion work
product, the strong public policy underlying the orderly prosecution
and defense of legal claims would be irreparably impaired.8 2
While the absolute immunity accorded opinion work product by
the court in Duplan has been adopted by other courts,8 3 the Duplan
view of the non-discoverability of opinion work product is very much a
minority view. An overwhelming majority of courts and commenta-
tors reject both the reasoning and result of Duplan.8 4
77. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
78. Id. at 236-37.
79. Id. at 238.
80. 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
81. Id. at 734.
82. Id. at 735-36.
83. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976); APL Corp. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F.R.D. 10, 14 n.2 (D. Md. 1980).
84. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 377-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Clermont, supra note 68, at 821-26; Note, Protection of Opinion
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The rejection of absolute immunity for opinion work product by a
majority of those who have examined the issue is premised on an ex-
amination of the decision in Hickman, on the structure of Rule
26(b)(3) and the accompanying advisory committee notes, and on the
rejection by the Supreme Court, contemporaneous with the decision
in Hickman, of a revised rule of procedure granting absolute immu-
nity to opinion work product.
In 1946, a revision to Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure was proposed. The proposal contained a clear declaration that
opinion work product was absolutely immune from discovery.8 5 In-
stead of adopting the revised rule, the Supreme Court decided Hick-
man and opted for a caselaw approach to the issue of discoverability.
8
A careful reading of Hickman reveals that the Court left open the
door to the discoverability question when it held, with regard to the
opinion work product in issue, that "[i]f there should be a rare situa-
tion justifying production of these matters, petitioner's case is not of
that type."8 7 The Court, with the revision to Rule 30(b) in hand, could
have made clear that opinion work product was absolutely immune
from discovery, but chose instead to indicate that "rare situations jus-
tifying production" might exist. In the almost four decades since
Hickman was decided, the Supreme Court, although it has had the
opportunity to do so, has never addressed the discoverability issue be-
yond what it said in its seminal work product decision.8 8
Equally as significant as the rejection of the revisions to Rule 30(b)
and the specific language of Hickman is the wording and structure of
Rule 26(b)(3), which was adopted in 1970. While the drafters of the
Rule could easily have incorporated the clear prohibition against dis-
closure of materials that reflect an attorney's mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, and legal theories that was contained in the earlier
Work Product Under The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REv. 333,
337-40 (1978).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) as proposed read in pertinent part:
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemni-
tor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless
satisfied that denial of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice
the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing his claim or
defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The court shall
not order the production or inspection of any part of the writing that
reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories ....
5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946) (emphasis added).
86. "In deciding the Hickman case, the Supreme Court appears to have expressed a
preference in 1947 for an approach to the problem of trial preparation materials
by judicial decision rather than by rule." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory com-
mittee notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1970).
87. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947).
88. UpJohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981).
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proposed revisions to Rule 30(b), they did not do so. Instead, the Rule
sets out a very explicit standard for disclosure of ordinary work prod-
uct and then, almost as an afterthought, adds the phrase that "the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney,"8 9 when ordinary
opinion work product is to be disclosed. In light of the advisory com-
mitte notes to Rule 26(b)(3), which repeatedly state that the Rule con-
forms to the holding in Hickman and its progeny,9 0 one must be very
cautious of the argument that the "shall protect against disclosure"
phrase contained in the Rule imposes absolute immunity from discov-
ery for opinion work product.91 Since the Court in Hickman never
imposed absolute immunity, and a majority of subsequent cases have
found some degree of discoverability for opinion work product,92 the
language of the advisory committee notes substantially weakens any
argument that the "shall protect against disclosure" phrase imposes
absolute protection from discovery.
The better view, and the one that has been adopted by a majority of
courts and commentators, is that opinion work product is entitled to
substantially greater protection than ordinary work product, but is not
absolutely immune from discovery. 93 Therefore, unlike ordinary
work product, opinion work product cannot be discovered simply upon
a showing of "substantial need" and an "inability to secure the sub-
stantial equivalent of the materials by alternate means without undue
hardship." 94 The question remains then, what type of showing is re-
quired in order to compel an attorney to disclose materials or informa-
tion that reflect his or her personal impressions, conclusions, opinions
or theories.
D. Approaches to Discoverability
While a majority of courts have agreed that opinion work product
is, to some extent, subject to discovery, agreement on when and under
what cirucumstances disclosure is, required has been far from uniform.
On the issue of discoverability the courts have seemingly split into two
very distinct camps. One camp's approach, usually referred to as strict
protectionism, 95 is best exemplified by In re Murphy,96 which held
that "opinion work product enjoys nearly absolute immunity and can
89. See supra note 44.
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 500 (1970).
91. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.
1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
92. See supra note 84.
93. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977).
94. These are the discoverability standards for "ordinary" work product contained in
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
95. Clermont, supra note 68, at 828.
96. 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977).
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be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances." 97
These circumstances, the court observed, existed only where "weighty
considerations of public policy" and the "proper administration of jus-
tice" clearly militate in favor of disclosure of the opinion work product
in issue.98
Courts that have followed the strict protectionist approach have
found only a few areas where consideration of public policy and the
administration of justice results in the balance of factors tipping in
favor of disclosure. For example, a number of such courts have found
that opinion work product that was created in futherance of a crime,
fraud, or other type of misconduct loses its protected status and is dis-
coverable, 99 since to shield it from disclosure is "fundamentally incon-
sistent with the basic premises of the adversary system."' 0 0 A second
and, in some ways, related area of discoverability exists when the ac-
tivities, advice, and/or knowledge of an attorney are a central issue in
the litigation. For example, when a party affirmatively asserts reli-
ance upon an attorney's advice as a defense in an action, discovery of
materials reflecting that advice has been permitted even though the
disclosure clearly involves opinion work product.l0l Similarly, when a
primary issue in the case involves the time and manner of discovery of
certain facts by an attorney (relating to issues involving the statute of
limitations),102 the prior relationship between various parties and
their counsel (relating to agreements that allegedly deprived the
plaintiff of certain rights), 03 or prior knowledge of an attorney re-
garding the validity of certain claims brought in an action (relating to
allegations of bad faith in asserting claims that the party, through
counsel, knew or should have known in advance were invalid),104
courts have brushed aside the protections accorded opinion work prod-
uct and have permitted discovery of the information at issue. Once
again, the theory behind allowing discovery has been that it would be
fundamentally inconsistant with the basic principles of the adversary
system to do otherwise. 0 5 Thus, considerations of public policy and
97. Id. at 336.
98. Id.
99. In re International Sys. & Controls Corp., 693 F.2d 1235, 1241-43 (5th Cir. 1982);
In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079-80 (4th Cir. 1981); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand
Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1980).
100. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
101. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 931-33 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
102. American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 80 F.R.D. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
103. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 F.R.D. 520, 524 (D. Colo.
1964).
104. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979, 981-83 (E.D.
Wis. 1969).
105. While each of these examples of discoverable opinion work product may appear
to result from some form of waiver on the part of the resisting party, waiver has
never been asserted as the basis for permitting disclosure. The fact that the infor-
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the administration of justice overwhelmingly militate in favor of dis-
closure even when courts are adhering to the so-called strict protec-
tionist approach to the issue of the discoverability of opinion work
product.
The second of the two fundamental approaches to discoverability is
usually referred to as the balancing approach.06 The courts that ad-
here to this view assert that, as opposed to a preconceived set of fac-
tual circumstances permitting discovery (the approach employed by
the strict protectionists), resolution of the discovery issue "must rest
upon the balance struck in the particulars of a concrete case between
the competing interests of full disclosure and protection for the fruits
of the lawyer's labor. '1 07 In other words, the balancing approach con-
siders each case on its own merits without resorting to fixed factual
categories that alone permit discovery.
Having declared that an unfettered case-by-case approach is the
preferred analytical tool, the balancing courts then look at the impor-
tance of the information to the merits of the litigation,10s the difficul-
ties confronting the opposing party's efforts to acquire the needed
information for themselves,109 the degree to which opinion work prod-
uct is present in the requested materials,1 10 and the ultimate prejudice
to the party from whom the discovery is sought.111 Thus, the zone of
privacy that surrounds an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, and legal theories is balanced against the legal system's need
for the information involved so as to insure "a sound and intelligent
decision" on the merits. 1 2
A strict protectionist would criticize this balancing approach as
vague and unstructured, leaving too much to the individual discretion
of the court without clear and predictable standards that attorneys
and judges could use to resolve the discovery issue. Without clear
standards, they would argue, an attorney would play it safe and avoid
committing his or her thoughts to paper, thus defeating entirely one of
mation sought through discovery is at the very heart of the issues involved in the
case has been found to be sufficient to permit compelled disclosure. Bird v. Penn
Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1973). For a discussion of when concepts of
waiver apply to the discoverability of opinion work product, see infra notes 130-
38 and accompanying text.
106. Clermont, supra note 68, at 826.
107. United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
108. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
109. United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
110. Id See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir.
1970).
111. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
112. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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the principle purposes for creation of the work product doctrine in the
first place.113
A balancing court, on the other hand, would see the strict protec-
tionist approach as too rigid and mechanistic, lacking in the flexibility
necessary to address the exigencies of each case. More importantly, a
balancer would see the legal system as the loser if information critical
to a fair, orderly, and informed decision on the merits could be kept
from the court because it reflected, even in the smallest way, an attor-
ney's mental impressions.114 While balancers would acknowledge the
importance of protecting opinion work product from routine discov-
ery, that protection, they would argue, must give way if the informa-
tion involved was critical to a sound and just determination of the case
on its merits. 1 5
Each of the two fundamental approaches to the discoverability is-
sue is based upon principles that clearly underlie the adversary sys-
tem. The strict protectionists favor opinion work product immunity as
a means of promoting the thorough, efficient, and professional prepa-
ration of all cases that move through the adversary system.11 6 The
balancing courts, however, favor the principles inherent in the deposi-
tion-discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that per-
mit each party, and ultimately the court, to obtain the "fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts . ,,*"117
Having based their approach to discoverabiity on two substantially
divergent principles, it is hardly surprising that each camp heavily
criticizes the other. But must there be two distinctly divergent ap-
proaches? Is there a middle ground that accomodates the needs and
philosophy of both camps? The answer is that, upon closer examina-
tion, the views of both groups have areas of overlap that can form the
foundation for a single unified approach to the discoverability issue.
IV. A UNIFIED APPROACH TO DISCOVERABILITY
In creating a unified approach to discoverability, we must first ex-
amine what protections are, in reality, currently accorded opinion
work product. For, like the creation of myths and superstitions, the
use of grand phrases like those that surround the principles underly-
ing the work product doctrine create an image and atmosphere that
are often far from the realities of the objective world.
113. Note, supra note 84, at 344-45.
114. Xerox Corp. v. International BusineSs Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
115. Id.
116. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 524 F. Supp. 357 (D. Md. 1981).
117. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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A. Current Litigational Realities
1. Narrowed Protection Under the Federal Rules
The most startling of the current realities surrounding opinion
work product is that the protections accorded such materials have
been substantially narrowed by amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing interrogatoriesilS and requests for admis-
sion.11 9 The drafters of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules
made quite clear what they had in mind when they commented in the
advisory committee notes that while Rules 33 and 36 allowed for dis-
covery of certain mental impressions, opinions, or conclusions, the
documents, prepared by an attorney, which contained these matters
were generally insulated from discovery by the work product protec-
tion contained in Rule 26(b)(3).120 In other words, the information
was discoverable, but the attorney's private documents were not.
While the attorney's thought processes might be validly probed by the
opposing party through the use of interrogatories and requests for ad-
mission, the written embodiment of those thoughts were generally to
be protected. What was being encouraged, therefore, through codifica-
tion of the work product doctrine was not the formulation of an attor-
ney's mental impressions, opinions, and conclusions but simply the
recording of those thoughts after they had come into existence.12 1
Once we recognize that the protections contained in Rule 26(b)(3)
promote primarily written preparation of a matter by counsel, we see
that the amendments to Rules 33 and 36 promote the goals of the dep-
osition-discovery rules enunciated in Hickman, i.e., to permit all par-
ties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial.122 This includes the the opinions, conclusions, and legal
theories of counsel that are directly related to the facts and allegations
present in the case.123
Without embarking on a lengthy discussion of the boundries within
which one may validly seek an attorney's opinions, conclusion or theo-
ries by way of interrogatory or request for admission, let it suffice to
say that a party may be compelled to disclose its factual opinions and
conclusions regarding the claims and defenses present in a case 124 and
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 502 (1970).
121. It should be noted that the concept of an attorney "recording" his or her impres-
sions, opinions, or conclusions encompasses more than simply writing them down
in some fashion. With the current state of data storage and retrievable systems,
opinion work product may be contained on a piece of paper, a floppy disk, a com-
puter tape, a strip of microfilm, or any number of storage media.
122. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 502 (1970).
124. Leumi Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 295 F. Supp. 539, 542
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its legal theories applicable to the facts alleged.125 In general, if the
opinion work product sought by way of interrogatory or request for
admission serves a valid and substantial purpose in the litigation, such
as enabling a party to determine the extent of proof that will be re-
quired at trial126 or narrowing the issues present in the case, 12 7 then
disclosure of the information sought will be required. Only when the
discovery seeks the reasoning process by which an attorney has ar-
rived at a particular discoverable conclusion or seeks information not
directly related to the facts in the case will discovery be precluded.128
In the real world of litigation, disputes over opinion work product are
primarily disputes over the attorney's internal working papers and not
over the information contained therein, since such information is
often discoverable by other means.1 29
Recognizing that substantial areas of opinion work product are
readily discoverable under -the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is only one step in the process of injecting a healthy
dose of reality into our examination of the protections accorded an
attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, and theories. The next
step is to see that concepts of waiver and the applicability of various
evidentiary concepts have further limited an attorney's ability to pro-
tect his or her opinion work product from discovery.
2. Waiver and Related Concepts
Unlike waiver of the attorney-client privilege that occurs when in-
formation is disclosed to virtually any third party,1 30 waiver of the
protections accorded work product occurs only when the protected in-
formation is disclosed to an adversary or to a third party whose posses-
sion of the information substantially increases an adversary's
opportunities to obtain it.133 Disclosure alone does not, in and of itself,
automatically lead to waiver of opinion work product protection. An
attorney often discloses his or her thoughts to a third party in order to
obtain information, advice, or assitance in the preparation of a client's
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Lincoln Gateway Realty Co. v. Carri-Craft, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 303
(W.D. Mo. 1971).
125. O'Brien v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 443 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ga.
1977).
126. Scoville Mfg. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 357 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D. Del. 1973).
127. Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 61 F.R.D. 411, 414 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
128. Spector Freight Sys., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 58 F.R.D. 162, 164 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b) advisory committee notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 524 (1970).
129. Disclosure may be obtained through the use of interrogatories and requests for
admission pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 33 and 36, instead of by way of a request for
production pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
130. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
131. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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case.132 To hold that such disclosure constitutes waiver of the protec-
tions accorded opinion work product would virtually reduce an attor-
ney's case preparation to a lonely cerebral exercise devoid of any
contact with the myriad of people who could provide necessary advice
and assistance. Thus, the zone of privacy accorded an attorney's pre-
paratory efforts on behalf of a client also encompasses those people
with whom the attorney shares information in the preparation of a
client's case. Only when such disclosure of an attorney's impressions,
opinions or conclusions substantially increases an adversary's ability
to obtain the information involved does waiver of opinion work prod-
uct protection occur.133
The concept of waiver, as discussed above, is entirely consistent
with the theory and purpose of the work product doctrine as enunci-
ated in Hickman. But the reality of the litigative world is that the
concept of waiver goes well beyond mere disclosure to someone whose
status increases the opposing party's opportunity to obtain the infor-
mation involved. For example, if an attorney uses work product
materials in preparing someone for their deposition, the opposing
party is entitled to disclosure of that information to aid them in exami-
nation of the witness. 3 4 This is true even if the materials contain
opinion work product and the witness is closely associated with the
disclosing party, i.e., an expert.135 To achieve this result the courts
have used Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 136 or have relied
on portions of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure137 to
hold that work product protection is waived when immunized materi-
als are used to directly shape and influence the testimony of a witness.
To do otherwise would be to pervert the legal process and render
meaningless an examining party's opportunity for thorough and prob-
ing examination of a witness who has been prepared for his deposition
or trial appearance by the opposing party. As the Supreme Court
132. Such third parties may be experts, investigators, insurers, and even other parties
with an interest common to that of the attorney or the client. See, e.g., In re Doe,
662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642
F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
133. Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84, 89 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
134. Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1982); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
135. Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
136. FED. R. EVID. 612 provides that if, prior to testifying, a witness uses a writing to
refresh his or her memory, a court may order the document to be produced to the
cross-examiner if the court determines it is necessary in the interests of justice.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) permits discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts. The Rule has been used as the basis for ordering disclosure of informa-
tion relied on by an expert in preparing to testify as a witness. See Boring v.
Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407-08 (D. Colo. 1983).
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noted in the context of trial testimony, a party who calls a witness on
direct examination:
can no more advance the work-product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testi-
monial use of work-product materials than he could elect to testify in his own
behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross-
examination on matters reasonably related to those brought out in direct
examination.1
3 8
Running through each of the litigational realities, from the amend-
ments to Rules 33 and 36, to the various manifestations of the applica-
tion of waiver, a single fundamental precept can be glimpsed. An
attorney enjoys a zone of privacy in the unfettered preparation of his
or her client's case only as long as the legal system's search for truth
in the litigation context is not unreasonably hampered. However,
when promotion of thorough case preparation through the protection
of an attorney's work product so distorts or hampers a court's ability
to receive and consider information critical to a fair, orderly, and just
determination of the case, the benefits bestowed by the work product
doctrine must give away.139 Otherwise, case preparation becomes a
barrier to clear, informed, and thorough presentation of evidence
upon which a court can make an informed decision. It is this principle,
appearing over and over in the litigational realities surrounding the
work product doctrine, which can and should form the basis for a uni-
fied approach to the issue of discoverability of opinion work product.
B. The Foundational Concepts
In developing a unified approach to the discoverability issue we
must begin with several foundational concepts. First, we must accept
the proposition that opinion work product is potentially discoverable
and reject the proposition that it is absolutely immune from disclo-
sure. Since an overwhelming majority of courts and commentators
agree that opinion work product is discoverable, such a foundational
concept is not a departure from existing theory or practice.140
The second foundational concept that underlies the proposed uni-
fied discovery approach is that opinion work product enjoys a greater
degree of protection than does ordinary work product. Since ordinary
work product can be discovered only upon a showing of substantial
need and an inability, without undue hardship, to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means, opinion work product
requires something more to compel its disclosure. This notion is virtu-
ally a universal view of the protection accorded opinion work product
and therefore does not represent a departure from existing theory or
138. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 240 (1975).
139. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
140. See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
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practice.141
The third foundational concept is that each case must be examined
individually, taking into consideration the facts, allegations, theories,
and behavior of the parties. Both the balancing courts and the strict
protectionists recognize that each case must be examined on its own
facts to determine whether disclosure of opinion work product is war-
ranted. The only difference between the two approaches employed by
the courts is the range of individual circumstances that result in a
favorable disclosure decision.142
C. The Unified Discovery Standard
Armed with these three foundational concepts we can proceed to
define a standard for discoverability that unifies the views of the strict
protectionists and the balancing courts without substantially violating
either camp's fundamental view of the role opinion work product
plays in the litigation process. Recognizing that we are only dealing
with that limited area of opinion work product that does not fall
within the zone of discovery permitted by Rules 33 and 36 or that re-
sulting from application of the concept of waiver, the formulation of a
unified discovery standard would read as follows:
Materials that constitute opinion work product are discoverable only upon a
showing that they are essential to a determination of the case on its merits,
and assertion of work product immunity is fundamentally inconsistent with
the basic concepts of fairness and informed decisionmaking that lie at the very
heart of the adversary system.
It should be noted that the fundamental structure of the proposed
standard promotes the truth-seeking goal of the adversary system by
insuring that only information or materials, the protection of which
could effectively prevent a party from obtaining relief on a potentially
meritorious claim, would be subject to compelled disclosure. Careful
examination of the standard reveals that it comports with the three
foundational concepts discussed above and also satisfies the primary
concerns underlying the approaches espoused by the strict protection-
ists and the balancing courts.1 43
141. UpJohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336
(8th Cir. 1977); Note, supra note 84, at 334-37.
142. The balancing courts look to the role the particular information in issue contrib-
utes to a "sound and intelligent decision" on the part of the trier of fact. See
Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). The strict protectionists examine the information in issue to see if it
clearly falls into one of a limited number of specific categories that are based on
considerations of "public policy" and the "administration of justice," before deter-
mining whether compelled disclosure is warranted. See supra notes 96-105 and
accompanying text.
143. Application of the unified discovery standard presupposes that the procedural
steps set forth in the concluding section of this Article have been satisfied. Un-
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Turning first to the three foundational concepts,1 44 it should be
noted that the unified discovery standard (1) permits discovery of
opinion work product, (2) but only in those rare situations where a
party can show that the information is "essential" to a determination
of the case on its merits and assertion of work product immunity is
"fundamentally inconsistent" with the basic concepts of fairness and
informed decisionmaking that lie at the heart of the adversary system,
and (3) a determination of what constitutes materials "essential" to a
determination on the merits and "fundamentally inconsistent" with
basic concepts of fairness and informed decisionmaking rests on an ex-
amination of the particular facts surrounding each case. Thus, the
three foundational concepts are clearly satisfied by the proposed uni-
fied discovery standard.
The strict protectionists adhere to the view that opinion work
product is discoverable only in a few exceptional circumstances.
These involve primarily the so-called "fraud" and "at-issue" excep-
tions.145 It should be apparent that each of these exceptions is clearly
covered by the unified discovery standard. Since basic concepts of fair-
ness and informed decisionmaking do not permit evidence of illegal
conduct to be shielded from disclosure by assertion of a protection
designed primarily to promote the vitality of the adversary system,
evidence of illegal conduct-fraud for example-would clearly be dis-
coverable through application of the unified discovery standard.146
Similarly, when an attorney's actions constitute the very matters that
are at issue in a case, materials bearing on those actions are essential
to an informed decision on the merits and, like illegal conduct, denial
of disclosure would be fundamentally inconsistent with basic concepts
of fairness and informed decisionmaking.147
less those procedural steps discussed in the text accompanying notes 159-66 have
been carefully applied, application of the unified standard would be premature.
144. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
146. "Ain attorney's opinion work product cannot be privileged if the work was per-
formed in furtherance of a crime, fraud, or other type of misconduct fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the basic premises of the adversary system." In re Sealed
Cased, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); "When the case being prepared involves
the client's ongoing fraud, however, we see no reason to afford the client the
benefit of this doctrine. It is only the rightful interests of the client that the work
product doctrine was designed to protect." In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury,
640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1970); "The work product rule recognizes the lawyer's
services as an indispensable part of the judicial scheme, but it was not designed as
a fringe benefit for protecting lawyers who would, for their personal advantage,
abuse it." In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981).
147. "[W]hile an attorney's private thoughts are most certainly deserving of special
protections, I believe that the concern for the lawyer's privacy must give way
when the advice of counsel is directly at issue." Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1976); "[When the activities of counsel
are inquired into because they are at issue in the action before the court, there is
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While exceptional circumstances are clearly accomodated by the
unified discovery standard, so are the concerns of those courts that
approach discoverability by balancing the parties' competing interests
in full disclosure and in protecting the fruits of an attorney's intellec-
tual labors.14 8 Since the balancing courts' analytical focus is on the
nature of the case, the nature of the information sought, and the ulti-
mate prejudice to the litigation process if the materials are protected
from disclosure,4 9 the unified standard's requirement that the infor-
mation be essential to an informed decision on the merits and that the
assertion of immunity be fundamentally inconsistent with basic con-
cepts of fairness and informed decisionmaking accomodates the bal-
ancers' concerns while imposing a substantial burden upon the party
seeking discovery.50
Even though the proposed unified discovery standard accomodates
the primary concerns of the two existing approaches to the issue of
discoverability, the strict protectionists will surely criticize it as too
vague and leaving too much discretion in the hands of individual
cause for production of documents that deal with such activities, though they are
'work product'." 4 J. MOORE, supra note 48, § 26.64 [3.-2], at 26-385.
148. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979, 982 (E.D.
Wis. 1969).
149. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
150. Some notion of the boundaries implicit in the unified discovery standard can be
seen in examining two somewhat similar cases. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947), the Court held that work product materials regarding interviews with
potential witnesses were protected from disclosure because, among other things,
the witnesses and their prior testimony at a public hearing were available to op-
posing counsel who had sought the work product at issue "only to help prepare
himself to examine the witnesses and to make sure that he has overlooked noth-
ing." Id. at 513. Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no suggestion
that the defendants had been incomplete or dishonest in their answers to plain-
tiff's discovery. In other words, the information was not central to an informed
decision on the merits and its protection from disclosure was not inconsistent
with fundamental concepts of fairness and informed decisionmaking. In Xerox
Corp. v. International Business Machs, Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the
work product at issue was again an attorney's notes regarding interviews with
potential witnesses (i.e., employees of defendant). Plaintiff's counsel had deposed
many of these witnesses only to discover that they could not remember informa-
tion regarding events that were central to the issues in the case (i.e., the presence
and use of Xerox trade secrets by IBM). The court found that "[a] party should
not be allowed to conceal critical, non-privileged, discoverable information, which
is uniquely within the knowledge of the party and which is not obtainable from
any other source, simply by imparting the information to its attorney and then
attempting to hide behind the work product doctrine after the party fails to re-
member the information." Id. at 381-82. Since the information was central to a
decision on the merits (i.e., whether IBM had misappropriated Xerox's trade
secrets), and fundamental concepts of fairness and informed decisionmaking pre-
cluded protecting the information when the witnesses uniformly could not recall
critical information when deposed by plaintiff's attorney, discovery of the defense
attorney's interview notes was ordered.
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judges. Such discretion, they will argue, jeopardizes the sweeping na-
ture of the protection contemplated by the Supreme Court when it
recognized opinion work product immunity.
In answer to this criticism, we might first note that, in addition to
the "fraud" and "at issue" exceptions, most of the strict protectionist
courts also recognize that opinion work product may also be discovera-
ble in "rare and extraordinary circumstances."'15 What constitutes
such circumstances is left to the sound discretion of the judiciary, to be
determined within the framework of principles that underlie the strict
protectionist view that only substantial considerations of public policy
and the proper administration of justice can militate in favor of disclo-
sure.152 Clearly then, discretion is not unknown to the strict protec-
tionist approach to discoverability. As long as clearly articulated
principles exist to guide a court's exercise of discretion, even the strict
protectionists would agree that discretion in and of itself is not an in-
herently bad thing. Furthermore, there exists in the proposed unified
discovery standard a clear statement of principles, not unlike those
espoused by the strict protectionists, which can and should be used to
guide a court in the exercise of its discretion.
While work product immunity is a doctrine established by the
courts to enhance the vitality of the adversary system, the privilege
against self-incrimination is a constitutionally mandated protection
that "respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemna-
tion."1 53 With such a significant constitutional goal as its foundation,
the issue of when discovery, in a civil case, can be had over assertion of
a party's privilege against self-incrimination is one that could hardly
be left to a court's discretion based upon the facts of the particular
case at issue. Yet that is precisely the approach that today exists in the
federal courts.15 4
Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System,15 5 is an example of the
view that, in private party civil litigation, assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination in resisting a valid request for discovery re-
quires a court to examine the case on its merits and balance the par-
ties' competing interests in the information sought.156 Such a concept
clearly grants a court a great deal of discretion; in fact, potentially
more discretion than that afforded by the unified discovery standard
proposed in this Article.
151. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th
Cir. 1977).
152. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977).
153. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
154. Wolfson, Civil Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 15 PAC.
L.J. 785, 801-06 (1984). "
155. 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1980).
156. Id. at 1088.
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In Wehling, the plaintiff, who owned a number of trade schools,
filed a suit for libel alleging that he had been defamed by a television
news story. The broadcast in question alleged that the plaintiff had
defrauded both his students and the federal government by abusing
federal student loan and grant programs. When CBS sought pretrial
discovery from the plaintiff concerning his operation of the schools,
the plaintiff invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and as-
serted that a grand jury was in the process of investigating his schools.
The trial court ordered the plaintiff to answer the questions posed by
the defendant. The plaintiff then moved for a protective order asking
the court to fashion some type of relief short of outright dismissal that
would respect the rights of both parties. The trial court denied plain-
tiff's motion and ordered him to submit to discovery. Plaintiff once
again refused based on his privilege against self-incrimination, and the
court dismissed plaintiff's suit on the grounds that his refusal consti-
tuted a willful default.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit sought to balance the defendant's need
for the requested information against the constitutional protection the
plaintiff had the right to assert. The approach adopted by the Fifth
Circuit required the trial court to assess the relative weights of the
parties' competing interests with a view toward accommodating the
interests of both sides if at all possible. 157 While assertion of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination was given substantial weight, and even-
tually predominated in the balancing process, the court made clear
that circumstances could exist that required that the protections of
the privilege give way to a valid request for discovery.15s
There is little difference between giving a court the discretion to
balance the parties' competing interests where assertion of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is concerned, and requiring a court to
determine when information is essential to the fact-finding process
and preclusion of its disclosure fundamentally inconsistent with basic
concepts of fairness and informed decisionmaking. As long as asser-
tion of opinion work product immunity is given substantial weight in
the analytical process, a case-by-case analysis technique in which the
court must assess a variety of factors to resolve the discovery issue is
not an unstructured and unreasonably discretionary approach to de-
termine whether disclosure is appropriate.
Defining a standard to be used in determining the discoverability
of opinion work product is only a first step in providing a unified ap-
proach to resolution of the discovery issue. Equally important is the
procedural framework within which the standard is to be applied on a
case-by-case basis. Without an appropriate procedural framework, an-
157. Id.
158. Wheling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 611 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 64:248
OPINION WORK PRODUCT
alytical consistency and reasonable predictability of result are difficult
to insure.
D. Procedural Considerations
In considering the procedural steps appropriate to a determination
of the discoverability of opinion work product, it is important to keep
in mind that all avenues short of permitting direct disclosure must
first be examined and resolved before application of the unified dis-
covery standard is attempted. In this way only exceptional circum-
stances will ultimately result in a disclosure decision. To achieve this
goal, the following analytical framework is suggested.
First, it should be determined whether the information sought is
reasonably relevant to the subject matter of the action within the pa-
rameters set forth in Rule 26(b).159 If the information is of questiona-
ble relevance, the disclosure question can be resolved on the basis of
relevance and the work product issue need not be addressed.
Second, if the requested information is relevant, it should then be
determined whether work product immunity has been invoked in a
timely and appropriate manner.160 If the immunity has not been
properly invoked, further analysis would be unnecessary.
Third, if the requested information is relevant, and the immunity
properly invoked, it should then be determined whether the same or
equivalent materials are reasonably and appropriately available from
sources other than the opposing party. The ability to obtain the infor-
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) reads in pertinent part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether
it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowl-
edge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at trial, if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence.
Note that this relevancy standard is much broader than the standard for rele-
vance used at trial pursuant to FED. R. EVD. 401.
160. Failure to object to a discovery request within the time fixed by the applicable
discovery rule or statute acts as a waiver of available objections. Davis v. Fendler,
650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981). This is true even for an objection that the
information sought is privileged. United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D.
570 (E.D. Ill. 1975). The automatic waiver provisions that exist in conjunction
with a number of the discovery rules, including interrogatories, FED. R. Civ. P. 33;
Shenker v. Sportelli, 83 F.R.D. 365 (E.D. Pa. 1979), requests for admission, FxD. R.
CIV. P. 36; Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 363 (N.D. Ala. 1976), and requests for
production, FED. R. CIV. P. 34; Balistrieri v. Holtzman, 55 F.R.D. 470, 472-73 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), make imperative that assertion of the protections of the work product
doctrine be accomplished in a clear, succinct, and timely manner.
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mation from another source may avoid the work product issue
entirely.161
Fourth, if the information is relevant and only available from a
party's counsel, then it must be determined whether the information
at issue meets the requirements for classification as opinion work
product.162 If it is determined that the materials in question are not
opinion work product, the heightened protection accorded opinion
work product need not be considered.
Fifth, if the information is found to be opinion work product, it
should then be determined whether it is more appropriately available
by way of interrogatory or request for admission pursuant to Rules 33
and 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 3 While information
sought by way of one discovery device (i.e., requests for production or
deposition) may present opinion work product problems, shifting to a
different discovery tool may resolve the problem without need to ad-
dress the more difficult disclosure issues.
Sixth, if a shift to another discovery device is not possible, then it
must be determined whether the party resisting discovery has, in
some manner, waived the protections normally accorded opinion work
product.164 If disclosure of the information to a third party has sub-
stantially increased the probability of discovery by the party seeking
the information, waiver has occurred and the ultimate discoverability
issue need not be addressed.
Seventh, if waiver has not occurred, it should then be determined
whether the relevant information sought by way of discovery can be
distilled from the opinion work product materials in such a way as to
prevent disclosure of the attorney's impressions, opinions, conclusions,
or theories while providing the discovering party the information he
or she has requested.165 Often, this distillation process is undertaken
by the court after in camera submission of the materials in issue by
the resisting party.166
Eighth, if the disputed information cannot be distilled in such a
161. For example, under the provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), a non-party, upon
request, must be provided a copy of any statement they previously made regard-
ing the action or its subject matter. If plaintiff's counsel obtained such a state-
ment, defendant's counsel may face the bar of the work product doctrine in
attempting to obtain it through discovery. However, before addressing the disclo-
sure issue, the non-party whose statement is involved might simply be persuaded
to request a copy of the statement pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) and then
provide the statement to the party seeking it through discovery.
162. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
165. Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
166. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 928 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 44-45, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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way as to satisfy both parties' interests in the disclosure, then applica-
tion of the unified discovery standard must be undertaken. This
would begin with a determination of whether the information sought
is essential to a determination of the case on its merits.67 Since only a
limited category of information can be considered central to the deci-
sionmaking process, many discovery requests would not be able to
meet this aspect of the standard and the inquiry would end here.
Ninth, if the information were found to be essential to the decision-
making process, then it would finally have to be determined whether
denial of disclosure was fundamentally inconsistent with the basic
concepts of fairness and informed decisionmaking that lie at the heart
of the adversary system.1 68
Tenth, even if disclosure is found appropriate, inquiry should be
made as to the need for and/or the appropriateness of any conditions,
protections or restrictions that should be imposed upon the handling
or use of the opinion work product disclosed as a result of the applica-
tion of the unified discovery standard. 69 The power to impose such
conditions, protections or restrictions flows directly from the provi-
sions of Rule 26(c) pertaining to the issuance of protective orders.70
If counsel and the courts approach the problem of compelled dis-
closure of opinion work product in the analytical and procedural man-
ner set out above, few contested matters will be found to require
application of the unified discovery standard. Those matters that do
167. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the
Supreme Court introduced into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure notions of
what constitutes discovery essential to a fair determination of a case when it
adopted the 1983 revision to FED. R. CiV. P. 26, which reads in pertinent part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtaina-
ble from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii)
the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the par-
ties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
168. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
169. The sensitive nature of opinion work product materials might require that an
attorney being granted its disclosure be restricted in (1) who might see or use the
materials, (2) whether copies can be made, (3) to what purposes the materials can
be put (e.g., physical testing, detailed indexing, etc.), (4) the arrangements for
storing and/or handling the materials (e.g., locked storage, restricted access, de-
tailed logging of access and use, etc.), and (5) return of the materials at the termi-
nation of the litigation or earlier.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) permits a court to enter a protective order directing, among
other things, "(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and con-
ditions ... (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way
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will yield results that are reasonably consistent, logical, and, in the
end, sufficiently predictable to allow parties and their counsel to re-
solve opinion work product disputes without need of judicial
involvement.
V. CONCLUSION
With the creation of the work product doctrine in Hickman v. Tay-
lor,171 the legal profession acquired a protection in many ways broader
and more pervasive than that bestowed by the attorney-client privi-
lege.172 By dividing that protection into "ordinary" work product and
"opinion" work product,173 and according the latter a substantially
greater degree of protection,174 confusion and disagreement soon set
in as to the vulnerability of an attorney's zone of privacy when the
opposing party sought potential work product through discovery.
Since Hickman was decided, the courts and the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have had little trouble dealing in a logical
and consistent manner with the issue of the discoverability of ordinary
work product. 75 But where opinion work product is concerned, the
drafters of the Federal Rules have failed to provide any meaningful
guidance on the issue of discoverability, 76 and the courts have pur-
sued three very distinct and often divergent approaches to the
problem.177
The time has come to adopt a single discovery standard for opinion
work product that takes into consideration not only the fundamental
concerns that underlie both the concept of work product protection
and the goals of the litigation process, but also the reality of discovery
practice as it exists today in the federal courts. Based upon a careful
consideration of all three factors, the discovery standard that has been
proposed in this Article, along with the suggested procedural and ana-
lytical framework for applying the standard in a given case, allows
counsel and the courts to address the discoverability issue in a simple,
logical, and coherent fashion consistent with the primary concerns ex-
pressed by a majority of courts that have considered the problem.
The unified discovery standard that has been proposed herein does
not establish a set of mechanical rules that provide absolute certainty
at the expense of those practical considerations that are dictated by
the individual facts of each case. The ultimate focus of any inquiry in
which the discovery standard is in issue must be on the fundamental
171. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
172. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 33.
175. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 77-84 & 95-112 and accompanying text.
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fairness of the proceeding in light of the concerns for informed deci-
sionmaking and the vitality of the adversary system that lie at the
very heart of the perpetual conflict between liberalized discovery and
the protection accorded opinion work product. 7 8
178. Recently, the Supreme Court observed in a criminal case that excluding truth
from the decisionmaking process, as a means of promoting adherence to princi-
ples dedicated to the proper administration of the justice system, was often ac-
companied by enormous societal costs. The Court held that when the costs of
excluding truth from the decisionmaking process reached unacceptable levels,
the adversary system had to have access to the information involved, even in the
face of long accepted countervailing principles. Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501,
2510-11 (1984).
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